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is a "watershed" rule that is essential to the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding. Saiwyerv. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822,2831 (1990). Although the
first exception also covers classes of people not subject to the death
penalty, it did not apply to the Sawyer case because it did not involve a
"primary, private individual conduct," nor was he a member of a
protected group such as the extremely young or retarded. See Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815
(1988) (See summary of Saffle v. Parks, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.)
The court evaluated Sawyer's claim under the second Teague
exception, and held the Caldwell claim to be insufficiently fundamental.
"It is thus not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at
improving accuracy oftrial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under
this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also 'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to the
fairness of a proceeding." Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076 (quoting Mackey,
401 U.S. at 693)(emphasis in original).

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA

to the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal process. All
eighth amendment jurisprudence in capital cases is directed towards
accuracy and reliability, and if the standard for the second exception
were not so extreme, much new eighth amendment law could satisfy the
second exception.
The Court majority opined that a lesser standard would undermine
the principles of finality that are essential to the functioning of the
criminal justice system. "The 'cost imposed upon the State(s) by
retroactive application of the new rules of constitutional law on habeas
corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefits of this application."'
Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831-32 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S.
638, 654 (1984)). In the view of the majority, the interest in reliability
of a death sentence established in Eddings, Lockett, Gardner, and
Woodson, is balanced against the interest in finality, and the cost to the
states. Eighth amendment reliability loses.
Sawyer clearly continues the narrowing of federal habeas corpus
review, and consequently re-emphasizes the importance of trial and
direct appeal. Therefore, it is more important than ever to avoid waiver
and default at trial by making federalized objections, including objecting
to the prosecutor's argument on Caldwell grounds.
Summary and analysis by:
Robert L. Powley

The Supreme Court essentially closed the door on the second
exception under Teague. Justice Kennedy made it very clear that it is
unlikely the court will find any new components of dueprocess essential
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Petitioner Jeffrey Walton and two codefendants encountered the
victim, Thomas Powell, at a bar in Tucson. After robbing Powell at
gunpoint, the trio forced the victim into his own car and drove him into
the desert. Walton marched Powell into the desert, forced him to lie
down on the ground and shot him once in the head. A medical examiner
later determined that the gunshot wound did not immediately kill Powell
and that Powell regained consciousness before dying of starvation and
dehydration.
Walton was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery,
kidnapping, and theft by control. Under the Arizona first-degree murder
statute, the capital sentencing hearing must be conducted before the trial
judge. The court must impose the death sentence if it finds first, one or
more of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute and second,
that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
At Walton's sentencing hearing, the judge found two aggravating
circumstances: (1) that the murder was committed in an especially
heinous, cruel ordepraved manner, and (2) that the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain. The judge also concluded that there were no
mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. On direct
appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld Walton's sentence. Walton
contended that Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved"
aggravating circumstance, as interpreted by the Arizona courts, fails to
channel the sentencer's discretion as required under the Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
Arizona's application of the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved"
aggravating circumstance satisfied the requirements of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel
or depraved" aggravating circumstance was constitutionally sufficient
because the Arizona Supreme Court gave substance to the operative
terms ofthestatute through use ofanarowingconstruction or definition,
and because the trial judge, rather than ajury, determines the sentence.
The trial judge is presumed to know and to apply the narrowing
constructions. The Arizona court previously had stated that a crime is
committed in an especially cruel manner "when the perpetrator inflicts
mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death" and that
"mental anguish includes a victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate."
State v. Walton,769 P.2d 1017,1032 (Ariz. 1989). Further, an especially
depraved manner occurs when the perpetrator either "relishes the
murder, evidencing debasement or perversion," or shows an "indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure" in
the killing. 769 P.2d at 1033. The Supreme Court concluded, therefore,
that these definitions gave meaningful guidance to the sentencer and
thus were constitutional.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In order to prevent the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,
the eighth amendment requires a method ofmeaningfully distinguishing
cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not. Godfrey v. Georgia,446 U.S. 420,433 (1980).
One method of making the required distinction is to require the
application of a narrowing construction to aggravating circumstances.
Recently, the Court found Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious,
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or cruel" aggravating circumstance to be invalid under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments because the words themselves did not direct the
jury's discretion in deciding when the death penalty is appropriate.
Maynard v. Cartwright,486 U.S. 356 (1988). The Court had earlier
found Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman"
circumstance to be invalid because nothing in those words, standing
alone, implied any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death sentence. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
In reaching its decision in Walton, the Court referred to its previous holdings in Godfrey and Maynard. The statutory aggravating
factors at issue in both of those decisions were found to be unconstitutionally vague under the eighth amendment. The Walton Court, however, held that vague factors may be constitutionally applied as long as
the state court sufficiently narrows the definition of those aggravating
factors and communicates that narrow definition to the sentencer.
The Court rejected Walton's argument that the Arizona statute
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments because it imposed the
burden of establishing mitigating circumstances on the defendant and
declared Arizona's allocation of the burden permissible under the
Constitution. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3056 (1990). The
Court also dismissed Walton's argument that Arizona's death penalty
statute created a presumption that death is the proper sentence since it
provides the court "shall" impose the death penalty if one or more
aggravating circumstances are found and mitigating circumstances are
held insufficient to call for leniency. (See case summaries of Boyde v.
Californiaand Blystone v. Pennsylvania, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.)
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, announced that in the
future, he would not vote to uphold an eighth amendment claim that the
sentencer's discretion to consider mitigation was unlawfully restricted
in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Scalia said that he would no
longer abide by the Court's decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina,428
U.S. 280 (1976), andLockettv. Ohio,438U.S. 586 (1978), whichrequire
the consideration of anything offered as mitigation evidence.
Virginia attorneys shouldbe aware of similarities between the
Arizona and Virginia capital murder statutes. In Virginia, the State must
prove one of two aggravating factors to support the death penalty. The
jury may impose the death penalty if it finds (1) that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threatto society (future dangerousness); or (2) thatthe defendant's
conduct in committing the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim" (vileness). Va. Code Ann. § 19.2264.4(C) (Repl. Vol. 1990). Virginia's vileness factors are virtually
identical to Georgia's factors, evaluated in Godfrey, which were in turn
equated to "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" inMaynard.Thus, all Supreme
Court decisions interpretating the statutory aggravating factors of"heinousness" and "vileness" are directly applicable to Virginia.
In Walton, the Supreme Court found Arizona's aggravating factor
constitutional because the Arizona Supreme Court gave substance to the
operative terms of the death penalty statute. The Court noted that the
construction given by the Arizona Supreme Court to the cruelty aspect
of the aggravating circumstance was virtually identical to the construc-

tion the Court approved in Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365.
The Virginia Supreme Court has also purportedly applied a
narrowing construction to two of the Virginia statutory aggravating
circumstances. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248
S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978). The three components of the Virginia vileness
factor are torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated battery. In Smith,
the court defined "depravity of mind" as "a degree of moral turpitude and
psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of
ordinary legal malice and premeditation."Id. "Aggravated battery" means
"a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than
the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder." Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court has not passedjudgment on the application of Virginia's
vileness factors. Thus, application of those factors in Virginia death
penalty cases remains constitutionally suspect and defense counsel
should object to the application of the vileness factor based on Godfrey,
Maynard, and Walton. Virginia's sentencing scheme differs from
Arizona's scheme primarily because the jury, and not the trial judge,
determines the sentence. Therefore, the application of the aggravating
factor in Arizona may have been saved in a way not possible in Virginia.
Further, the Walton decision presumes that a judge will apply the
proper narrowing construction. In dicta, the Court indicated that "when
a jury is the final sentencer, it is essential that the jurors be properly
instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process. It is not enough
to instruct thejury in the bare terms of an aggravating circumstance that
is unconstitutionally vague on its face." Walton, 110 S. Ct. at3057. If that
dictum is true, Virginia's refusal to explain mitigation and failure to
explain the option to vote for life imprisonment, even if aggravating
circumstances are found, is probably error. Additionally, it is possibly
error to refuse jury instructions giving accurate parole information and
giving information about specific mitigating circumstances.
For example, Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(D), which provides the jury with verdict forms to use in determining the defendant's
sentence, may be indicative of an unconstitutional failure to fully
instruct jurors on the narrowed meaning of aggravating circumstances.
The first of those instructions allows the jury to sentence the defendant
to death if it "finds" aggravating factors and "considers" mitigating
factors. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(D) (Repl. Vol. 1990). The second
instruction allows the jury to sentence the defendant to life in prison if
it "considers all of the evidence in aggravation and mitigation" of the
offense. Id. Thus, it may be unclear to the jury members that they may
sentence the defendant to life in prison even if aggravating circumstances are found.
In light of the Walton dictum, which says it is essentialtoproperly
instruct jurors regarding all facets of the sentencing process, counsel
should prepare jury instructions informing jurors that they may sentence
the defendant to life imprisonment even if they find one or both
aggravating factors. The instructions should also inform the jury that
particular factors, supported by the evidence, may be considered as
mitigating.
Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas

